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Abstract
Planning and executing volitional actions in the face of conflicting habitual responses is a crit-
ical aspect of human behavior. At the core of the interplay between these two control systems lies
an override mechanism that can suppress the habitual action selection process and allow execu-
tive control to take over. Here, we construct a neural circuit model informed by behavioral and
electrophysiological data collected on various response inhibition paradigms. This model extends
a well established model of action selection in the basal ganglia by including a frontal executive
control network which integrates information about sensory input and task rules to facilitate well-
informed decision making via the oculomotor system. Our simulations of the antisaccade, Simon
and saccade-override task ensue in conflict between a prepotent and controlled response which
causes the network to pause action selection via projections to the subthalamic nucleus. Our
model reproduces key behavioral and electrophysiological patterns and their sensitivity to lesions
and pharmacological manipulations. Finally, we show how this network can be extended to in-
clude the inferior frontal cortex to simulate key qualitative patterns of global response inhibition
demands as required in the stop-signal task.
Download the model at: http://ski.clps.brown.edu/BG Projects/
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1 Introduction
“Before you act, listen. Before you react, think. Before you spend, earn. Before your criticize, wait.”
This quote by Ernest Hemingway highlights our basic tendency to act impulsively while reminding
us that sometimes it is advisable to inhibit these prepotent response biases and act more thoughtful.
Recent scientific advancements have shed light on the neural and cognitive mechanisms that imple-
ment inhibitory control of prepotent response biases (Andre´s, 2003; Aron, 2007; Logan, 1985; Miyake
et al., 2000; Stuphorn and Schall, 2006; Munoz and Everling, 2004). As part of this effort, a multitude
of tasks exist to study response inhibition empirically. Among the tasks thought to require selective
response inhibition are the antisaccade task, the Simon task, and the saccade-override task. Each of
these tasks induces a prepotent response bias that sometimes needs to be overridden with a controlled
response based on executive control. For example, the antisaccade task requires subjects to saccade in
the opposite direction of an appearing stimulus. The Simon task requires subjects to respond according
to an arbitrary stimulus-response rule (e.g., respond left or right depending on stimulus color), but
where the stimulus is presented on one side of the screen, inducing a prepotent response bias to that
side. In congruent trials the stimulus is presented on the same side as the correct response indicated
by the rule, whereas on incongruent trials it is on the opposite side. Finally, the saccade-override task
(Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007) requires subjects to saccade in the direction of a stimulus of a particular
color for several repetitions in a row. On so-called switch-trials the instruction cue indicates that the
other colored stimulus is now the target, so that the participant has to override the initial planned
response and switch to the other one. While critical differences exist, all of these tasks require subjects
to inhibit a prepotent response and replace it with a different response. In contrast, while also requir-
ing response inhibition, the well-studied stop-signal task does not require subsequent initiation of an
active response but only outright inhibition of the planned response (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008).
Electrophysiological and functional imaging data implicate key nodes in frontostriatal circuitry as
being active during response inhibition and executive control. At the cortical level, these include the
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) (Aron et al., 2003; Chambers et al., 2007; Sakagami et al., 2001; Xue
et al., 2008) the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Wegener et al., 2008; Funahashi et al., 1993;
Johnston and Everling, 2006), the supplementary eye fields (SEF) (Schlag-Rey et al., 1997), the pre-
supplementory motor area (pre-SMA) (Congdon et al., 2009; Aron et al., 2007a; Isoda and Hikosaka,
2007), and the frontal eye fields (FEF) (Munoz and Everling, 2004). At the subcortical level, the
striatum (Zandbelt and Vink, 2010; Watanabe and Munoz, 2011; Ford and Everling, 2009), the sub-
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thalamic nucleus (STN) (Eagle et al., 2008; Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008; Hikosaka and Isoda, 2008; Aron
and Poldrack, 2006; Aron et al., 2007a) and the superior colliculus are involved. Manipulations that
disrupt processing in either frontal or subcortical areas cause deficits in response inhibition (Cham-
bers et al., 2007; Ray et al., 2009; Verbruggen et al., 2010). Moreover, response inhibition deficits are
commonly observed in a wide range of psychiatric patients with frontostriatal dysregulation, including
attentiondeficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Nigg, 2001; Oosterlaan et al., 1998; Schachar and
Logan, 1990), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Chamberlain et al., 2006; Menzies et al., 2007;
Penade´s et al., 2007; Morein-Zamir et al., 2009), schizophrenia (SZ) (Huddy et al., 2009; Bellgrove
et al., 2006; Badcock et al., 2002), Parkinson’s disease (PD) (van Koningsbruggen et al., 2009) and
substance abuse disorders (Monterosso et al., 2005; Nigg et al., 2006).
Together, the above data suggest that intact functioning of the entire fronto-basal ganglia network
is required to support response inhibition. However, it is far from clear that the underlying source of
these deficits is the same. Inhibitory control is a very dynamic process, influenced by different inter-
acting cognitive variables and neuromodulatory systems. Thus, response inhibition can be impacted
by not only dysfunctional stopping per se, but can also be influenced by changes in motivational state
(Leotti and Wager, 2010), attentional saliency (Morein-Zamir and Kingstone, 2006), maintenance and
retrieval of task rules (Hutton and Ettinger, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Reuter and Kathmann,
2004; Roberts et al., 1994), and separable modulations of selective vs global inhibition mechanisms
(Aron, 2011), to name a few. Although electrophysiological recording studies demonstrate neuronal
populations that differentiate between successful and unsuccessful stopping (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008,
2007), or inhibition of prepotent responses in favor of controlled responses (Watanabe and Munoz, 2009;
Ford and Everling, 2009), there is at present no coherent framework integrating all of these findings
into a single model attempting to account for patterns of electrophysiological data, or selective disrup-
tions of component parts and their effects on behavior.
The point of departure for our neural model builds on existing theorizing and data regarding the
differential roles of the three main pathways linking frontal cortex with the basal ganglia (BG), often
referred to as the direct, indirect and hyperdirect pathways. According to this framework, the corticos-
triatal direct “Go” and indirect “NoGo” pathways together implement a selective gating mechanism
by computing the evidence for facilitating or suppressing each of the candidate motor actions identi-
fied by frontal cortex. Dopamine plays a critical role in this model by differentially modulating the
activity levels in the two striatal populations, affecting both learning and choice. During rewards and
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punishments, phasic bursts and dips in dopamine neurons convey reward prediction errors (Montague
et al., 1997) that transiently amplify Go or NoGo activity states, and therefore activity-dependent
plasticity. In this manner, these striatal populations learn the positive and negative evidence for each
cortical action (Frank, 2005). More chronic increases in tonic dopamine levels also directly affect
choice by shifting the overall balance of activity toward the Go pathway over the NoGo pathway,
thereby emphasizing learned positive relative to negative associations and speeding responding (and
vice-versa for tonic decreases in dopamine). Many of this model’s predictions have been validated
with behavioral studies involving dopaminergic manipulations and functional imaging in humans and
monkeys (e.g., Frank et al., 2004; Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006; Palminteri et al., 2009; Voon et al.,
2010; Jocham et al., 2011), and synaptic plasticity and opto-genetic and genetic engineering studies in
rodents (Kravitz et al., 2010; Hikida et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2008; Kravitz et al., 2012).
Note that in the above model, responses are selectively facilitated or suppressed via separate stri-
atal Go and NoGo populations modulating the selection of particular cortical actions. However, more
recent models have also incorporated the third hyperdirect pathway from frontal cortex to the STN to
BG output. Communication along this pathway provides a global and dynamic regulation of the gating
threshold, by transiently suppressing the gating of all responses when there is conflict between alter-
native actions (Frank, 2006; Ratcliff and Frank, 2012). Empirical studies using STN manipulations
(Frank et al., 2007a; Wylie et al., 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2011) direct recordings (Cavanagh et al., 2011;
Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008; Zaghloul et al., 2012), and fMRI/DTI (Aron et al., 2007a) have similarly
supported this notion.
Nevertheless, the existing BG model cannot handle situations in which an initial prepotent re-
sponse is activated but then needs to be suppressed – either altogether, or in favor of a more controlled
response – situations typically studied under the rubric of “response inhibition”. Here, we extend
the model by incorporating additional cortical regions that facilitate executive control and can inhibit
and override the more habitual response selection mechanism. We consider dynamics of the prepotent
response process, the subsequent detection that this response needs to be inhibited, and the inhibition
process itself – and how all of these factors are modulated by biological and cognitive variables. We
consider electrophysiological data in various frontal (DLPFC, FEF, preSMA, ACC) and basal ganglia
(striatum, STN) regions that are well captured by the model, and how these are linked to functional
parameters of a high level decision making process embodied by a variant of the drift diffusion model.
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Neural models are complex, in that they involve a number of parameters interacting to produce
nonlinear effects on dynamics and behavior. There is also a risk of overfitting that could result from
adjusting parameters to precisely match electrophysiological data from one experiment, which may
make it difficult to precisely capture electrophysiological (or behavioral) data from a different exper-
iment. Thus our aim was instead to capture qualitative patterns of data in both electrophysiology
at multiple levels of cortical and subcortical network, and of the effects of their manipulation on be-
havior, with a single set of parameters.1 In other work (Wiecki & Frank, in preparation) we show
that systematic variations in neural model parameters are related in a lawful, monotonic fashion to
more computational level parameters in a modified drift diffusion framework, providing a principled
understanding and falsifiable experimental predictions. Moreover, despite the qualitative nature of
model fits here, we nevertheless aim to distinguish our model from others in the literature based on
general principles independent of particular parameterizations. Towards this goal we extracted a set
of qualitative behavioral and neurocognitive benchmark results (listed in the results section) which we
use to assess the validity of our model and compare to other models.
As noted above, despite surface features suggesting a single integrated response inhibition network,
there are actually multiple dynamic components that can affect inhibition. Our contribution in this
paper is to formalize these separable neural processes, to explore their interactive dynamics. To
summarize and preview the core aspects of our work:
• We present a neural network model of the three main frontal-BG pathways supporting prepotent
action selection, inhibitory control, conflict-induced slowing, and volitional action generation.
• We show that behavioral changes in a range of tasks dependent on these basic processes can
result from alterations in brain connectivity and state and provide testable predictions for effects
of distinct brain disorders.
• Selective response inhibition involves global conflict-induced slowing via the hyperdirect pathway,
raising the effective decision threshold to prevent prepotent responding, followed by DLPFC
induction of striatal NoGo activity to inhibit the planned prepotent response. Subequently,
the DLPFC provides top-down facilitation onto striatal Go populations encoding the controlled
response.
1By qualitative we mean that we do not attempt to quantitatively fit the precise shape of firing of any given cell
type, but we do aim to show that a given population of cells increases or decreases firing rate at a particular point in
time relative to some task event or to some estimated cognitive process. For example, for an area to be involved in
inhibition it must show increased activity prior to the time it takes to inhibit a response. Or in striatum, particular
cell populations are active related to biasing the prepotent response, suppressing that response, and then activating the
controlled response - our model recapitulates this qualitative pattern.
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• Response selection and inhibition are further regulated by neuromodulatory influences including
dopamine linked to changes in motivational and attentional state. Dopamine reflects potential
reward values and facilitates Go actions. In addition, our model suggests that while selective
response inhibition is influenced by tonic levels of DA, global response inhibition is not.
• Our model is challenged in its ability to overcome prepotent responses and evaluated by its ability
to reproduce key qualitative patterns reported in the literature, including:
– Behavioral RT distribution patterns in selective response inhibition tasks.
– Electrophysiological activity patterns of the FEF (Everling and Munoz, 2000), pre-SMA
(Hikosaka and Isoda, 2008), the STN (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008), striatum (Watanabe and
Munoz, 2009), SC (Pouget et al., 2011; Pare and Hanes, 2003) and scalp recordings (Yeung
et al., 2004a).
– Psychiatric, developmental, lesion and pharmacological manipulations of frontal function
and DA modulations.
• We show that when our model is extended to include the rIFG it can recover key electrophysio-
logical and behavioral data from the stop-signal task literature.
In sum, this approach provides a mechanistic account of a major facet of cognitive control and
executive functioning, which we hope will allow for a richer understanding of the relationship between
behavioral, imaging, and patient findings.
2 Neural Network Model
We first introduce the neural circuit model of interacting dynamics among multiple frontal and basal
ganglia nodes and their modulations by dopamine. We then describe how we vary model parameters
to capture biological and cognitive manipulations.
Overview The model is implemented in the Emergent software (Aisa et al., 2008) with the neuronal
parameters adjusted to approximate known physiological properties of the different areas (Frank,
2005, 2006). The simulated neurons use a rate-code approximation of a leaky integrate-and-fire neu-
ron (henceforth referred to as units) with specific channel conductances (excitatory, inhibitory and
leak). Multiple units (simulated neurons) are grouped together into layers which correspond to dis-
tinct anatomical regions of the brain. Units within each layer project to those in downstream areas,
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and in some cases, when supported by the anatomy, there are bidirectional projections (e.g., bottom-up
superior colliculus projection to cortex as well as top-down projections from cortex to colliculus). We
summarize the general functionality of the model here to foster an intuitive understanding; implemen-
tational and mathematical details can be found in the appendix. While a single set of core parameters
(i.e. integration dynamics and overall connection strength between layers) is used to simulate various
electrophysiological and behavioral data in the intact state, each reported simulation is tested on 8
networks with randomly initialized weights between individual neurons. The model can be downloaded
from our online-repository http://ski.clps.brown.edu/BG_Projects .
The model represents an extension of our established model of the BG (Frank, 2005, 2006; Wiecki
and Frank, 2010). Because the extended model involves multiple components, we will progressively
introduce each part, beginning with its core and then describing how each new component contributes
additional functionality.
Basic basal ganglia model The architecture of the core model is similar to Frank (2006). While the
original model simulated manual motor responses, our model features a slightly adapted architecture
in accordance to the neuroanatomy and physiology underlying rapid eye-movements (i.e. saccades) as
reviewed in Hikosaka (2007) and Munoz and Everling (2004). Stimuli are presented to the network in
the input layer, corresponding to high level sensory cortical representations. An arbitrary number of
motor responses can be simulated, but here we include a model with just two candidate responses. The
input layer projects directly to the cortical response units in the frontal eye fields (FEF) which imple-
ments action planning and monitoring and projects to the superior colliculus (SC), which acts as an
output for saccade generation (Sparks, 2002). The SC consists of two units coding for a leftward and a
rightward directed saccade. If the firing rate of one unit crosses a threshold, the corresponding saccade
is initiated (Everling et al., 1999). The time it takes an SC unit to cross its threshold from trial onset
is taken as the network’s response time (RT). Stimulus-response mappings can be prepotently biased
by changing projection strengths (i.e. weights) so that certain input patterns preferentially activate
a set of FEF response units more than the alternative response units. (These sensory-motor cortical
weights can also be learned from experience, such that they come to reflect the prior probability of
selecting a particular response given the sensory stimulus; (Frank, 2006)). In fact, with only these
three structures our model would only be capable of prepotent, inflexible responding.
By itself, FEF activation is not sufficiently strong to initiate saccade generation because the SC is
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Figure 1: Box-and-arrow view of the neural network model. The sensory input layer projects to the
FEF, striatum and executive control (i.e. DLPFC, SEF and pre-SMA). Via direct projections to FEF
(i.e. cortico-cortical pathway), stimulus-response-mappings can become ingrained (habitualized). FEF
has excitatory projections to the SC output layer that executes saccades once a threshold is crossed.
However, under baseline conditions, SC is inhibited by tonically active SNr units. Thus, for SC units
to become excited, they have to be disinhibited via striatal direct pathway Go unit activation and
subsequent inhibition of corresponding SNr units. Conversely, responses can be selectively suppressed
by striatal NoGo activity, via indirect inhibitory projections from striatum to GP and then to SNr.
Coactivation of mutually incompatible FEF response units leads to dACC activity (conflict or entropy
in choices), which activates STN. This STN surge makes it more difficult to gate a response until the
conflict is resolved, via excitatory projections to SNr, effectively raising the gating threshold. Striatum
is innervated by DA from SNc which amplifies Go relative to NoGo activity in proportion to reward
value and allows the system to learn which actions to gate and which to suppress. The instruction
layer represents abstract task rule cues (e.g. antisaccade trial). The DLPFC integrates the task cue
together with the sensory input (i.e. stimulus location) to initiate a controlled response corresponding
to task rules, by activating the appropriate column of units in FEF and striatum.
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under tonic inhibition from the BG output nucleus: the substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr), whose
neurons fire at high tonic rates. However, the tonic SNr-SC inhibition is removed following activation
of corresponding direct (Go) pathway striatal units, which inhibit the SNr, and therefore disinhibit
the SC (Hikosaka, 1989; Hikosaka et al., 2000; Goldberg et al., 2012). The indirect pathway acts in
opposition to the direct pathway by further exciting the SNr (indirectly, via inhibitory projections to
the globus pallidus (GP) which inhibits the SNr). Thus, direct pathway activity results in gating of
a saccade (i.e. Go) while indirect pathway activity prevents gating (i.e. NoGo). Striking evidence for
this classical model was recently presented by optogenetic stimulation selectively of direct or indirect
pathways cells, showing inhibition or excitation of SNr respectively, and resulting in increased or de-
creased movement (Kravitz et al., 2010).
The Go and NoGo striatal populations include multiple units that code for the positive and negative
evidence in favor of the FEF candidate actions given the sensory input context. Relative activity of the
striatal pathways is modulated by dopaminergic innervation from the Substantia Nigra pars compacta
(SNc) due to differential simulated D1 and D2 receptors present in the two pathways. In particular,
dopamine further excites active Go units while inhibiting NoGo units. These effects on activity also
produce changes in activity-dependent plasticity, allowing corticostriatal synaptic strength in the Go
population to increase following phasic dopamine bursts during rewarding events, and those in the
NoGo population to decrease (and vice-versa for negative events; (Frank, 2005)). For simplicity, in
the present model we omit learning because the paradigms we simulate do not involve learning, and
focus on associations that have already been learned. However, it is now well known that striatal unit
activity is modulated by the reward value of the candidate action, such that rewarding saccades are
more likely to be disinhibited (Hikosaka et al., 2006).
Bottom-up projections from SC to FEF allow action-planning to be modulated according to direct
and indirect pathway activity (Sommer and Wurtz, 2006, 2004a,b, 2002). This effectively forms a
closed loop in which FEF modulates the striatum which, via gating through SNr and SC, in turn
modulates the FEF. Loosely, FEF considers the candidate responses and ”asks” the BG if the corre-
sponding action should be gated or not. Thus, with these structures the model can selectively gate
responses modulated by DA.
In addition to the above gating dynamics, the overall threshold for gating is controlled by the ease
with which the SNr units are inhibited by the striatal Go units. The STN sends diffuse excitatory
10
projections to the SNr (Parent and Hazrati, 1995), and therefore when STN units are active they
increase the gating threshold for all responses, effectively contributing a ’global NoGo’ signal (Frank,
2006; Ratcliff and Frank, 2012). The STN does not however, act as a static increase in threshold.
Rather, the STN receives input directly from frontal cortex, and becomes more active when there is
response conflict (or choice entropy) during the early response selection process. In the current model,
conflict is computed explicitly by the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), which detects when
multiple competing FEF response units are activated concurrently, and in turn activates the STN to
make it more difficult to gate any response until this conflict is resolved. The full computational role
of dACC is far from resolved and likely to be more complex than conflict detection and control (see,
e.g. Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Botvinick et al., 2004; Alexander and Brown, 2011; Kolling et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, alternative accounts of dACC function (Kolling et al., 2012) are entirely compatible with
our model (an issue we return to in the discussion), but for convenience we label the computation as
“conflict”.
Frontal Pathway model
Volitional response selection So far our model is able to select/gate responses and slow down
gating when an alternative response appears to have some value relative to the initial planned action.
However, SRITs require executive control: integration of the sensory state together with the task
rule to not only inhibit the prepotent response but replace it with a volitional one. Such rule-based
processing is effortful and time-consuming, and hence the controlled response process lags that of the
initial fast response capture. Based on a variety of evidence, we ascribe the rule-based representations
to the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (e.g. Miller and Cohen, 2001; Chambers et al., 2009).
This structure is involvedin the active maintenance of stimulus-response rule representations (Derrfuss
et al., 2004, 2005; Brass et al., 2005), is necessary for correct antisaccade trials (Wegener et al., 2008;
Funahashi et al., 1993; Johnston and Everling, 2006), and is involved in selective response inhibition
(Garavan et al., 2006; Simmonds et al., 2008) and response selection (Braver et al., 2001; Rowe et al.,
2002). Moreover, SEF (Schlag-Rey et al., 1997) and pre-SMA (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2011) are also critically involved in correct SRIT performance.
We consequently added an abstract executive control layer to summarize the DLPFC, SEF and
pre-SMA complex (in the future referred to as DLPFC). This layer selects FEF responses and biases
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Figure 2: Neural network model in different task conditions. a) Prosaccade condition. (1) Left
stimulus is presented in input layer; (2) Prepotent weights bias left response coding units in FEF; (3)
Left response Go gating neurons in striatum are activated; (4) Left response coding units in SNr are
inhibited; (5) The left response unit in SC is disinhibited, and due to recurrent excitatory projections
with FEF, is excited and the action is executed. b) Antisaccade condition. The activity pattern early
in the trial (i.e. before DLPFC comes online) is similar to that in the prosaccade condition. (1) Left
stimulus is presented in input layer activating prepotent left response in FEF; (2) The unit coding for
the antisaccade condition is externally activated in instruction layer; (3) DLPFC integrates sensory
and instruction input according to task rules and activates right coding units in FEF together with
right Go gating units left NoGo units in striatum; (4) in FEF, right coding units are activated due
to DLPFC input in addition to the prepotent left coding units already active; (5) dACC detects co-
activation of multiple FEF action plans and activates (6) hyperdirect pathway to excite STN and SNr,
globally preventing gating until conflict is resolved. Eventually, stronger controlled DLPFC activation
of the right coding FEF response results in gating of the correct antisaccade (7). In some trials, DLPFC
activation is too late and the prepotent left saccade will have already crossed threshold, resulting in
an error.
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BG gating according to task rules (see figure 1). Although not explicitly represented separately in the
model architecture, we conceptualize the individual contribution of DLPFC as rule encoding and ab-
stract action selection whereas SEF and pre-SMA are transforming this abstract action representation
into concrete motor-actions (Schlag-Rey and Schlag, 1984; Schlag and Schlag-Rey, 1987; Curtis and
DEsposito, 2003). In turn, these planned motor actions can influence the selected response in FEF
and bias gating via projections to striatal Go and NoGo neurons (Munoz and Everling, 2004).
Anatomical and functional studies demonstrate projections from both DLPFC to SEF and pre-
SMA (Lu et al., 1994; Wang et al., 2005) and to striatum to affect response gating (Haber, 2003; Doll
et al., 2009; Frank and Badre, 2011); and from SEF to FEF (Huerta et al., 1987). We explore how
these projections impact dynamics of response selection. But how does the executive controller in our
model ’know’ which rule to activate? We do not address here how these rule representations arise via
learning, which is the focus of other PFC-BG modeling studies (see Rougier et al., 2005; Frank and
Badre, 2011; Collins and Frank, 2012). Instead, we simulate the state of the network after learning
by simply including an Instruction layer as a second input layer to the model encoding task condition
(e.g. antisaccade trial). In case of the antisaccade task, the sensory input layer encodes the direction
of the visual stimulus and the instruction layer encodes whether the network should perform a pro
or antisaccade. The DLPFC complex then integrates these two inputs and activates a (pre-specified)
rule unit that (i) projects to the correct FEF response units supporting the antisaccade; (ii) activates
striatal NoGo units to prevent gating of the active prepotent pro-saccade response, and (iii) activates
striatal Go units encoding the controlled antisaccade.
Critically, DLPFC units are relatively slow to activate the appropriate rule unit. This is due to the
need to formulate a conjunctive rule representation between the visual location of the stimulus and the
task instruction (either one of these is not sufficient to determine the correct response, and indeed, each
individual input provides evidence for multiple potential rules). Time constants of membrane potential
updating is reduced to support this integration, which also is intended to approximate slower time
course of rule retrieval and subsequent computation to determine the correct action (via interactions
with preSMA and SEF). Moreover, we include considerable inter-trial noise in DLPFC activation
dynamics so that executive control is available earlier on some trials while later on others. The slowed
integration and the increase of inter-trial noise in executive control are necessary for the model to
capture the quantitative benchmark results (demonstrated below). Moreover, the slower controlled
processing is also a core feature of classical dual process models of cognition (e.g. Sloman, 1996) and
the increased noise accords with the general statistical observation that longer latencies are typically
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associated with greater variability.
Competition between the two response selection mechanisms As outlined above, our model
features two response selection mechanisms: (i) a fast, prepotent mechanism driven by a biased pro-
jection from sensory input to FEF; and (ii) a slow, volitional mechanism that originates in the DLPFC
which integrates instruction and sensory input to select and gate the correct response. Importantly,
the volitional mechanism is slower but stronger than the prepotent one. If, due to noise in the speed of
integration, executive control is slower on some trials, it might be too late to activate the correct rule
representation before the prepotent response is gated. In contrast, when the executive controller is
faster, it activates the alternative FEF response, leading to conflict-induced slowing, and then actively
suppresses the prepotent response via projections to striatal NoGo units encoding the prosaccade.
This conceptualization can be regarded as a biologically plausible implementation of the cognitive
activation-suppression model (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Note however that our
implementation involves two suppression mechanisms, one in which conflict results in global threshold
adjustment, and another in which the prepotent response is selectively inhibited.
Modulations To test the influence of different biological manipulations on executive control paradigms,
we modify various parameters in the network model. Here, we list the different modulations and their
implementation.
• Prepotency : To simulate differences in the strength of the prepotent response capture of an
appearing stimulus (e.g., the prosaccade stimulus) we modulate the projection strength between
sensory input to the dominant response units in FEF and striatum.
• Speed of DLPFC : To simulate efficacy of prefrontal function we modulate the speed of DLPFC
integration, by adjusting the time constant of membrane potential updating in these units. Faster
updating implies proactive control.
• Connectivity of DLPFC : To simulate differences in intra-cortical connectivity we modulate the
DLPFC→FEF projection strength.
• Speed-accuracy trade-off : To simulate strategic adjustments in the speed-accuracy trade-off, we
modulate the connection strength between frontal cortex and striatum (Forstmann et al., 2010).
In particular, when speed is emphasized, the FEF more effectively activates striatal Go units
so that it is easier to reach gating threshold. In contrast, accuracy adjustments are reflected in
increased STN baseline ultimately increasing the response gating threshold.
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• STN impact : STN contributions are simulated by manipulating the relative synaptic strengths
from STN to SNr, effectively changing the amount of STN activity required to prevent BG gating
(Ratcliff and Frank, 2012; Cavanagh et al., 2011).
• tonic DA: Pharmacological and disease modulations of DA levels are simulated by either de-
creasing (e.g., PD) or increasing (e.g., SZ) tonic DA activity, which in turn modulates relative
activity of Go vs NoGo units.
2.1 Selective Response Inhibition
2.1.1 Methods
As summarized earlier, all SRITs have a common task structure. (i) A prepotent response bias is
induced by priming an action. In the antisaccade task this is a result of the appearance of a stimulus
that initiates a ’visual grasping reflex’ (Hess et al., 1946); in the Simon task this is the result of
placing the target stimuli on either side of the screen, initiating a response capture (Ridderinkhof,
2002); in the saccade-overriding task this is the result of repeated responding to the same colored
stimulus which renders this response habitual. (ii) In congruent trials, the correct response is the
same as the prepotently biased one. (iii) In incongruent trials, the correct response is incompatible
with the prepotently biased response, and subjects can use executive control to suppress the initially
predominant action in favor of the task-appropriate one.
We implemented this common task structure as follows in our neural network model (alternative
task implementations that accommodate the differences between the tasks lead to similar patterns so
we simplified in order to use a single task representation of this basic process, but nevertheless simulate
patterns of data evident in specific tasks below). Two stimulus positions, left and right, were encoded
in the input layer as two distinct columns of activated units. The prepotent bias toward an appearing
target was hard-coded by strong weights from each input stimulus to corresponding response units in
FEF. This prepotent weight facilitates fast responding for congruent trials, but biases responding in the
erroneous direction for incongruent trials. The DLPFC layer integrates sensory input and instruction
input to activate a conjunctive rule unit encoding the unique combination of sensory and instruction
input, which then projects to the associated correct response unit in FEF. Each of the four DLPFC
units project to the appropriate FEF response unit. Note that weights from the DLPFC to the FEF
are stronger than the prepotent bias connection from the input layer to the FEF so that the DLPFC
would eventually override an erroneous prepotent response. (The same functionality could be achieved
by simply allowing DLPFC units to reach a higher firing rate or to engage a larger population of units,
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instead of adjusting the weights). In addition, DLPFC units activate corresponding Go and NoGo
units in the striatum (e.g. in an antisaccade trial, Go units coding for the correct response and NoGo
units coding for the incorrect response get activated by top-down PFC input).
2.1.2 Results
We identified a set of key behavioral and neurophysiological qualitative patterns across SRITs that
form desiderata for our model to capture:
#1 Incongruent trials are associated with higher error rates than congruent trials (e.g Reilly et al.,
2006; McDowell et al., 2002; Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008).
#2 Reaction times (RTs) are faster for errors than correct trials (e.g Reilly et al., 2006; McDowell
et al., 2002; Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008).
#3 Strategic adjustments in the speed-accuracy trade-off (via changes in decision threshold) mod-
ulates functional connection strength between frontal cortex and striatum (Forstmann et al.,
2010). Similarly, STN activity is associated with modulations of the decision threshold (Ratcliff
and Frank, 2012; Cavanagh et al., 2011).
#4 Various psychiatric diseases associated with frontostriatal cathecholamine dysregulation lead to
increased error rates and speeded responses (e.g. Reilly et al., 2006; Harris et al., 2006; Reilly
et al., 2007; McDowell et al., 2002).
#5 Early activation of prepotent motor response, e.g. in EMG measurements (Burle et al., 2002).
#6 At least four different types of activation dynamics in FEF neurons during correct and error
incongruent trials (Everling and Munoz, 2000). Specifically, neurons coding for the erroneous
(i.e. prepotent) response are fast to activate and their activity is greater on error trials than
correct trials. In contrast, neurons coding for the correct (i.e. controlled) response are slower to
activate and their activity is reduced and delayed on error trials. See figure 6c for the quantitative
data that forms the basis of this qualitative pattern.
#7 At least four different types of striatal neurons with dissociable dynamics and direction selectivity
in congruent and incongruent trials (Watanabe and Munoz, 2009; Ford and Everling, 2009).
Specifically, (i) during prosaccades, distinct neural populations code for facilitation of the correct
response and suppression of the alternative; (ii) during antisaccade trials, (iia) neurons coding
for facilitation of the incorrect prepotent response initially become active but return to baseline
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Figure 3: a) Error rates in incongruent trials ± SEM relative to intact networks for different neural
manipulations. Networks make more errors with increased tonic DA levels, or STN dysfunction,
compared to intact networks. b) Response Times (RTs) ± SEM relative to intact networks, for pro
and antisaccade trials as a function of neural manipulations. For more analysis see the main text.
when (iib) neurons coding for the suppression of that response become active together with (iic)
neurons coding for facilitation of the correct controlled response (see figure 9b).
#8 Neurons forming part of the hyperdirect pathway from frontal cortex (pre-SMA, dACC) to the
STN show increased activity (i) before correct incongruent responses and (ii) after incorrect
incongruent responses, but (iii) baseline activity during congruent response (Isoda and Hikosaka,
2007, 2008; Yeung et al., 2004a; Zaghloul et al., 2012). This pattern of activity co-occurs with
delayed but more accurate incongruent responding.
In the following, we demonstrate how our model reproduces these qualitative patterns, before
linking its dynamics to a higher level computational description.
Behavior As expected, intact networks make considerably more errors on incongruent trials (error
rate of 15%) as compared to perfect performance in congruent trials (error rate close to 0%, not shown),
thereby capturing qualitative pattern #1.
Further, networks in general have longer response times (RTs) in incongruent trials (see figure
3(b)) thus capturing qualitative pattern #2. Incongruent trials are slower for two reasons: (i) it takes
time for executive control (DLPFC) computations due to the requirement to integrate two sources of
input to activate the associated rule; and (ii) once activated, the controlled response conflicts with the
prepotent response, leading to STN activation and associated increases in BG gating threshold.
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Additional analysis revealed that incongruent error trials are associated with faster RTs compared
to correctly performed incongruent trials (figure 4). In our model, errors are made when the faster
prepotent action reaches threshold before the inhibitory process can cancel it. This mechanism allows
the model to capture qualitative pattern #2 and #3.
We next investigated how these behavioral patterns were affected by manipulations (see figure 3(a)).
Incongruent error rates were most exaggerated with increased tonic DA levels, and by disrupted STN
function to simulate deep brain stimulation. The effect of increased striatal DA on incongruent error
rates captures corresponding patterns (see #4) observed in non-medicated schizophrenia patients, who
have elevated striatal DA (e.g Reilly et al., 2006; Harris et al., 2006; Reilly et al., 2007; McDowell et al.,
2002). Tonic DA elevations are associated with speeded responding in both congruent and incongruent
trials, due to shifted balance toward the Go pathway facilitating response gating. This same mech-
anism explains the increased antisaccade error rate. Conversely, decreased tonic DA leads to slowed
responding due to increased excitability of the indirect NoGo pathway. The model also predicts that
STN dysfunction produces increased error rates, due to an inability to raise the threshold required for
striatal facilitation of prepotent responses. Indeed, STN-DBS induces impulsive (fast but inaccurate)
responding in SRITs (Wylie et al., 2010).
Finally, we tested in more detail how systematic parametric changes in a biological variable af-
fect RT and accuracy. Figure 5(a) shows how RT distributions change under different settings of
FEF→striatum connection strength. Figure 5(b) shows quantitatively how increases in FEF→striatum
connectivity leads to faster RT and decreased accuracy (qualitative pattern #3). Loosely, increasing
FEF connection strength onto Go-units in the direct pathway leads to faster gating of responses. Con-
versely, increases in STN→SNr connectivity lead to slower RT and improved accuracy (figure 5(c)).
The reason for both of these effects is that they differentially modulate SNr activity. Recall that the
SNr tonically inhibits the thalamus, unless it is itself inhibited by the striatal direct pathway. Hence
any modulation of the ease with which SNr units are inhibited – either via stronger connections from
cortex onto Go units, or by increasing the SNr via the STN – will change the threshold required for
the BG to gate an action. Indeed, Ratcliff and Frank (2012) and Lo and Wang (2006) have shown
that these two mechanisms are related to changes in the decision threshold in sequential sampling
models. Our model subsumes both of these mechanisms, and suggests that these different routes are
themselves modulated by distinct cognitive variables, such as volitional speed-accuracy modulation
and conflict/choice entropy (cortico-striatal and STN). We return to this issue in the Discussion.
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Figure 4: a) RT histogram for correct and erroneous incongruent trials in the model. Error RT
distributions were shifted to the left due to prepotent response capture. This pattern is exaggerated
with increased tonic DA due to lowered effective gating threshold. b) RT histograms of a monkey
during the switch-task (reproduced from Isoda and Hikosaka (2008)). In blocks of trials, monkeys
are continuously rewarded following saccades to one of two targets. On so-called ’switch-trials’ a cue
indicates that the monkey should perform a saccade to the opposite target, requiring the monkey to
inhibit his planned saccade and perform a saccade to the opposite direction. As in the model, errors
are associated with shorter reaction time. c) Reaction time distribution of an alternative model with
fast DLPFC integration speeds. Correct trials are in red and errors in gray (not present). This model
cannot account for the behavioral pattern of errors and RTs as a function of congruency, in contrast
to models with slowed DLPFC integration (panel a).
In sum, our model captures key qualitative behavioral patterns described in the literature (see
above). Moreover, these patterns hold over varying biologically plausible parameter ranges leading
to predictable changes in the behavioral patterns. However, given the complexity of the underlying
model, it is also important to establish whether the internal dynamics of the different nodes of the
network are consistent with available electrophysiological data in this class of tasks.
Neurophysiology
DLPFC, SEF and pre-SMA activity Our model summarizes the computations of the execu-
tive control complex as a single layer corresponding to DLPFC, SEF and pre-SMA. One of our central
predictions is that DLPFC activation must be delayed relative to the habitual response mechanism
in order to produce the desired qualitative patterns. To demonstrate the plausibility of this account
we simulated networks with increased DLPFC speed (time constant of membrane potential updating).
Consequently, networks ceased to make fast errors while correct RTs became much faster and more
peaked (figure 4c). The reason for this pattern is that active executive control now dominates and
overrides the prepotent mechanism during early processing. This result implies that some delay in
executive control is needed to account for empirical findings in which incongruent RTs are delayed.
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Figure 5: a) RT distributions for incongruent trials by network models. FEF→striatum projection
strengths were varied along the x-axis. Correct RT distributions are on the right side of each panel and
incorrect RT distributions are on the left side, mirrored on the y-axis. This manipulation is equivalent
to a speed-accuracy adjustment, as shown empirically to vary with pre-SMA→striatal communication
(Forstmann et al, 2008; 2010), where here FEF plays the role of pre-SMA for eye movements as
compared to manual movements studied in Forstmann et al. b+c) Speed-accuracy tradeoff under
parametric modulation of (b) FEF→striatum connection strength and (c) STN→SNr connection
strength (color coded). Black represents low and yellow high connection strength. This pattern is
consistent with decision threshold modulation. The absolute values of connection strengths in these
different routes are chosen to lie on a sensitive range producing observable effects for demonstration
purposes.
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Figure 6: a) Average activity of individual superior colliculus (SC) units coding for the correct and
error response in correct and incorrect trials during incongruent trials aligned to stimulus onset. The
prepotent (i.e. erroneous) response comes on before the volitional, correct response. In incorrect trials
the error-unit threshold is crossed before the volitional response unit gets active. In correct trials
the error-unit is inhibited in time. b) Average activity of individual FEF units coding for prepotent
error responses and volitional correct responses during incongruent trials aligned to stimulus onset
(benchmark pattern #6) c) Electrophsyiological recordings in FEF of monkeys (reproduced from
Everling and Munoz (2000)).
SC and FEF activity Comparing single unit activation patterns of SC (see figure 6a) to those
of FEF (see figure 6b) reveals that the activation dynamics are very similar between those two regions.
Our model thus predicts that FEF can be interpreted as a cortical saccade planning/monitoring area
that directly influences saccade generation via its projections to SC (Munoz and Everling, 2004).
Moreover, SC activity reveals that in both, correct and incorrect incongruent trials, the incorrect
prepotent response unit becomes active before the controlled one, thus matching qualitative pattern
#5.
dACC activity As described earlier, the dACC computes co-activation of both response units
in FEF (i.e. when average activity is > 0.5) – a direct measure of conflict (or value of the alternative
action to that initially considered; see above). Consequently, its activity (see figure 7a) follows a similar
pattern as average FEF layer activity: conflict is present but resolved prior to responding in correct
trials while conflict is present after responding in error trials. However, dACC does not get active in
congruent trials, because it never shifts from one action to the other.
This qualitative pattern of peak conflict activation before correct incongruent trials but after incor-
rect incongruent trials matches event-related potentials (ERPs) commonly observed in human EEG
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Figure 7: a) Averaged dACC activity (corresponding to conflict in FEF) in prosaccade and correct
and incorrect incongruent trials. No conflict is present in congruent trials. During correct incongruent
trials, conflict is detected and resolved before the response is gated. During incorrect incongruent
trials, an incorrect response is made before conflict is detected. b) Activity recorded in monkey pre-
SMA during the switch-task (reproduced from Isoda and Hikosaka (2007)). c) EEG recordings from
the central scalp of humans during the Flanker task (reproduced from Yeung et al. (2004a)), thought
to originate from dACC. The N2 and ERN component closely match our modeling results, replicating
this aspect of the Yeung model.
studies (see figure 7c). The so-called error related negativity (ERN) which is measured after response
errors whereas the so-called N2 potential is measured before correct high conflict responses (Falken-
stein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). The idea that these two signals could merely represent ’two
sides of the same conflict coin’ and reflective of underlying dACC activity was first presented in the
modeling work by Yeung and colleagues (Yeung and Cohen, 2006; Yeung et al., 2004b).
STN activity As noted in the model description, conflict detection in the dACC results in delayed
(and more accurate) responding by recruiting the STN to prevent gating until conflict is resolved.
Indeed, this mechanism is in part responsible for the rightward-shifted RT distributions in correct
incongruent trials. Accordingly, this same pattern of increased activity before correct responses and
increased activity after error responses can be observed in STN (see figure 8a). Again, this qualitative
pattern was also found in STN recordings in monkeys by Isoda and Hikosaka (2008) (see figure 8b),
who showed that timing of STN firing relative to pre-SMA was consistent with communication along
this hyperdirect pathway.
The neurocomputational model of (Brown et al., 2004) interprets the role of STN differently. In
their model, STN is activated by the output structure (FEF in their case) to lock out the influence
of competing responses after a response has been selected. This is a critical difference to the account
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Figure 8: a) Averaged activity of the model STN layer during prosaccade and correct and incorrect
incongruent trials relative to response execution. During congruent trials STN units exhibit a small
early increase in activity that subsides. Correct incongruent trials show increased activity early on in
the trial which causes the conflict-induced slowing and prevents prepotent response gating. In error
trials, this mechanism is triggered too late and the incorrect response gets executed. b) Electrophys-
iological recordings of the monkey STN (reproduced from Isoda and Hikosaka (2008)) on correct and
incorrect switch trials and non-switch trials. c) Average activity of the STN layer of an alternative
model in which STN is not excited by dACC but instead by saccadic output (SC in our model) as
proposed by Brown et al. (2004). This model does not predict differences between trial types.
presented herein where STN plays a role in the selection of a response by raising the threshold prior
to response selection, thereby delaying execution but increasing accuracy. To show explicitly how our
model predictions can be qualitatively differentiated from this alternative model of STN function, we
disconnected dACC inputs into the STN and instead allowed only the output structure (SC in our
model) to project to it, so that STN function operates as it does in Brown et al (2004). As can be seen
in figure 8c, the activity pattern changes dramatically. Specifically, there is no more differentiation
of activation patterns between the different trial types as is observed in our model and the empirical
data (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008). Because STN only influences processing after response selection, it
also does not lead to delayed responding or decision threshold adjustment. This qualitative difference
in model predictions is fundamental and not subject to parameter tuning, as it reflects a distinct
computational role for the STN. Although we focused on the Brown model for demonstration purposes
here, other models of STN function with different connectivity would similarly not account for these
data. For example, the biophysical model of Rubchinsky et al. (2003) assumes that STN neurons
provide focused selection of a particular action (by disinhibiting SNr, taking the role of the direct Go
pathway) while simultaneously inhibiting competing actions (by exciting SNr in other columns). This
model cannot explain this activity pattern because co-activation of multiple cortical inputs does not
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result in increased STN activity (see figure 6b in Rubchinsky et al. (2003)).
Striatal activity Figure 9a shows striatal activity in congruent and incongruent trials (column I
and column II, respectively) for direct-path Go and indirect-path NoGo units (upper and lower rows,
respectively). In each case, activity selective to the correct and error responses are color coded. The
model closely captures the qualitative pattern across four cell populations (#7) identified in monkey
dorsal striatum recordings during the antisaccade task (see figure 9b and Watanabe and Munoz (2009);
Ford and Everling (2009)). In particular, for congruent trials, correct-coding Go neurons gate the
response while error-coding NoGo units suppress the alternative. In incongruent trials, Go neurons for
the error-coding prepotent response are initially activated, but are then followed by increased activity
of the corresponding NoGo population which then suppresses the initiated Go activity via NoGo→Go
inhibitory projections (Taverna et al., 2008). Finally, the controlled Go-correct units are activated and
an incongruent response is executed. Thus our model predicts that the pattern of electrophysiology
observed in empirical recordings arises due to top-down cognitive control modulation of direct and
indirect pathway neurons.
Note again that we can distinguish our model’s predictions from those of other models that omit
the indirect pathway as a distinct source of computation (there are several) or from models that do
include it but assign a different function. The neural network model of Brown et al. (2004) assumes the
indirect pathway activation defers execution of the correct action plan until the time is appropriate.
This would suggest that the executive control complex would activate NoGo units coding for the correct
response, not the incorrect response as in our model. To demonstrate how this leads to qualitatively
different patterns than is observed in our model and the data (see pattern #7 and figure 9c) in which
this alternative account is simulated in our model. (However, we note that the Brown et al model
could potentially accord with our model in the sense that they also advocate a mechanism by which
negative prediction errors drive learning in the NoGo cells, which after training on the AST may also
produce the patterns we observe here given that the prepotent response would be punished). Similarly,
the prominent model of Gurney et al. (2001) suggests that this pathway serves as a control pathway
rather than providing negative evidence against particular actions as in our model, and it is unclear
how this control function (while not disputed per se) would reproduce the patterns observed here.
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Figure 9: a) Averaged striatal activity during correct pro (first column) and incongruent trials (second
column) in Go (first row) and NoGo (second row) neuronal populations. In each case, activity for
correct (red) and error (blue) response coding units are shown separately. As described in the text,
the Go units for the prepotent response become active early in the trial for both trial types, but in
antisaccade trials these are followed by NoGo units which veto the Go activity and finally Go activity
for the controlled response due to top-down DLPFC activity. b) Electrophysiological recordings of the
monkey striatum (reproduced from Watanabe and Munoz (2009)). The first row represents neurons
coding corresponding to the executed response (i.e. Go neurons) and the second row represents neurons
coding that suppress execution of the corresponding action (i.e. NoGo neurons). c) Alternative model
simulating Brown et al. (2004) assumption that the indirect pathway acts to defer the execution of
the correct response, rather than suppress the alternative response. Note predictions for Go pathway
accord with those of our model and the data, but prediction of NoGo neurons differ.
2.2 Global Response Inhibition
2.2.1 Methods
In SRITs the selectively inhibited prepotent response must be replaced with another, controlled re-
sponse. Conversely, the stop-signal task (SST) requires outright response inhibition (e.g. Logan and
Cowan, 1984; Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Cohen and Poldrack, 2008) and is used to assess global in-
hibitory control (Aron, 2011). Specifically, subjects are required to make press left and right keys in
response to Go-cues appearing on a screen. On a subset of trials after the Go-cue has been presented,
a stop-signal is presented after variable delay (i.e. stop-signal delay; SSD) instructing the subject to
withhold responding.
Here we show that our model can also simulate the SST after we included the right inferior frontal
cortex (rIFG) with direct projections to STN (Aron et al., 2007a) see figure 10. Given the assump-
tions of the race model (i.e., a race between Go and Stop processes), one can estimate the stop-signal
reaction time (SSRT) by measuring the probability of successful inhibition at different SSDs. This
inhibition function is then compared to the distribution of Go reaction times in non-stop signal trials.
There are several extensive reviews of the SST (Verbruggen and Logan, 2009b), so here we focus on
how our model captures the available evidence. Note that the SST typically refers to the task involv-
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ing manual movements (and inhibition thereof), but a well studied equivalent has been used in the
oculomotor domain, where it is referred to as the ’countermanding task’. While the neuronal circuitry
involved in Go-responding depends on the response modality, the neuronal circuitry involved in the
global mechanism may be independent of the response modality (Leung and Cai, 2007).
Networks are presented with one of two input stimuli (left or right), represented by a column of
four units each. As in prior simulations, prepotent responses are implemented by weights from the
input units to the corresponding FEF response units, such that a left stimulus suggests a left response.
On 25% of trials, a stop-signal is presented with variable delay (by activating devoted units in the
sensory input layer). The stop signal units send excitatory projections directly to the rIFG layer.
rIFG units in the hyperdirect pathway excite the STN (Aron et al., 2007a; Neubert et al., 2010) and
prevent striatal response gating, and therefore inhibit responding if the SC has not already surpassed
threshold. In addition to this global rIFG-STN response suppression mechanism, the DLPFC com-
bines the stop-signal input and the stimulus location to selectively inhibit the associated response via
activation of the corresponding population of striatal NoGo units. Critically, this selective mechanism
is slower but remains active after the STN returned to baseline and prevents subsequent responding.
Thus, the model uses a fast, global but transient response inhibition mechanism and a slower, selective
but lasting mechanism (Aron, 2011). To estimate the SSRT, we use the dynamic one-up / one-down
staircase procedure for adjusting the SSD (e.g. Logan et al., 1997; Osman et al., 1986).
We tested the influence of rIFG lesions on the SSRT (Aron et al., 2004) by parametrically reducing
the projection strength of rIFG to the STN.
The selective norepinephrine (NE) reuptake inhibitor Atomoxetine increases NE release and im-
proves stop-signal performance in animals, healthy adults and adult ADHD patients (Chamberlain
et al., 2007, 2009). NE is hypothesized to adaptively change the activation gain of neurons in frontal
cortex (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). We consequently tested the influence of decreasing the gain
parameter in units of the frontal cortex2.
Finally, we simulated different motivational influences on stop-signal accuracy. Evidence for the
neural underpinnings of motivational biases comes from an fMRI study by Leotti and Wager (2010),
who reported that subjects instructed to focus on speed instead of accuracy exhibited a greater increase
2Gain modulates how step-like the activation-dynamics of units are in relation to their input activity. Low gain leads
to linear activation dynamics while high gain levels make a unit respond in a binary-like fashion.
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Figure 10: Extended neural network model including rFIG during stop-signal trials. (1) Left input
stimulus activates (2) left-coding FEF response units and (3) initiates gating via striatum (similar to
pro-saccade trial in a). After a delay, (4) the stop-signal is presented which activates (5) rIFG, which
in turn (6) transiently activates the STN and finally (7) the whole SNr to globally prevent gating.
Note, that DLPFC is beginning to get active to initiate selective response inhibition via striatal NoGo
units.
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in activations in brain regions associated with response facilitation, including the FEF and the striatum.
Conversely, when instructed to focus on accuracy, subjects exhibited greater activity in IFG regions
associated with response inhibition. We thus simulated these activation patterns to account for speed-
accuracy tradeoff in a similar manner as in the antisaccade simulations. In the speed-condition,
we manipulated the strength of FEF to striatum connections due to evidence that frontostriataal
connectivity is enhanced under speed emphasis (Forstmann et al., 2008, 2010; Mansfield et al., 2011).
Conversely, in the accuracy condition we increased baseline excitatory input to rIFG, allowing it to
be more excitable and hence facilitating STN recruitment. This simulation approximates the effect
of a putative PFC rule based representation to focus on accuracy. Recent data supports the notion
that the (right) STN, which receives input from rIFG, shows increased excitability associated with an
increased response caution during accuracy focus (Mansfield et al., 2011).
2.2.2 Results
As with the SRITs above we extracted a list of key qualitative results from the literature we use to
evaluate the fit of our model.
#1 The probability of inhibiting a response decreases monotonically as SSD increases (Verbruggen
and Logan, 2008).
#2 Error responses that escape inhibition are, on average, faster than Go responses on no-stop-signal
trials. However, while the distributions begin at the same minimum value, the responses that
escape inhibition have a shorter maximum value (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008).
#3 STN neurons are excited to stop signals but show little differentiation between stop-signal inhi-
bition and stop-respond error trials (Aron et al., 2007a). Contrary, downstream SNr neurons are
excited in correct trials but are disinhibited during error trials (Schmidt et al., 2012).
#4 SEF neurons are activated in stop-signal and stop-response trials after SSRT and can thus not
contribute to successful stopping (Stuphorn et al., 2000).
Behavior To illustrate the staircase procedure, figure 11(a) shows an example trace of how SSDs are
adjusted to assess 50% stop-signal accuracy. As can be seen, the network with rIFG lesion is impaired
at stopping and requires shorter SSD on average to inhibit successfully.
As can be seen in figure 11(b) the inhibition function resulting from testing the neural network
systematically with different SSDs reveals a monotonically decreasing probability of correctly stopping
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Figure 11: a) Progression of the staircase procedure for manipulating SSD in networks with reduced
rIFG-STN connectivity. Trial number is plotted on the x-axis and the stop-signal delay (SSD) in ms
(converted from simulator time) is plotted on the y-axis. If a response is successfully inhibited on
stop-signal trial, the SSD is increased by 20 ms to make it harder. If a response is erroneously made
on a stop-signal trial, the SSD is decreased by 20 ms. Networks without lesion are highest in general
representing the most effective Stop-process that is able to withhold responses even when the SSD is
quite long. b) Inhibition function of the neural network model in the stop-signal task. The model is
tested on systematically varying levels of stop-signal delay (SSD) in ms and the proportion of correctly
inhibited trials is plotted along the y-axis.
(qualitative pattern #1).
Cumulative RT distributions of Go and non-canceled Stop trials are presented in figure 12. Both
distributions match closely up until SSD+SSRT (qualitative pattern #2) suggesting that both are
generated by the same process.
Different modulations affect GoRT and SSRT in different ways (figures 13(a) and 13(b)). While DA
manipulations certainly speed GoRT, SSRT remains largely unaffected. On the other hand, when the
network is tested with reduced gain (simulating low NE levels), or has lesions to either STN or rIFG,
it exhibits SSRT deficits (increases). Finally, simulated accuracy emphasis results in slowed Go RT
but faster SSRT (more effective inhibition). The pattern that emerges from these results is that SSRT
is changed by modulations of parameters that are part of the global inhibitory pathway: rIFG and STN.
Neurophsyiology To assess the neural correlates of stopping behavior in our model we analyzed
STN and SNr activity aligned to stop-signal onset. As can be seen in figure 14, there is little differ-
entiation between stop-signal inhibition and error trials while SNr units show a marked dip in error
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Figure 12: a) Cumulative reaction time distributions of the neural network model and from a monkey
experiment. b) Cumulative reaction time distribution from a monkey experiment for comparison.
Reproduced from (Lo et al., 2009). The solid red line denotes mean stop-signal delay (SSD); the
broken red line denotes stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) offset at SSD. The broken blue horizontal
line represents 50% stopping accuracy. Note that the response distribution sums to the response
probability – not necessarily to 1.
↑ tonic
DA
act.
↓ tonic
DA
act.
tonic
NE
act
↑ tonic
rIFG
act
↑preSMA-
striatum
cons
↓ IFG-
STN
cons
↓STN-
SNr
cons
80
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
80
G
oR
T 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 in
ta
ct
 (m
s)
↑ tonic
DA
act.
↓ tonic
DA
act.
tonic
NE
act
↑ tonic
rIFG
act
↑preSMA-
striatum
cons
↓ IFG-
STN
cons
↓STN-
SNr
cons
80
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
80
SS
R
T 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 in
ta
ct
 (m
s)
Figure 13: a) Mean RTs in ms ± SEM (converted from simulator time) for Go trials under different
modulations (see text). b) Mean SSRTs in ms ± SEM (converted from simulator time) under different
modulations (see text).
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Figure 14: Average activity aligned to stop-signal onset for inhibited and error stop-signal trials. a)
Striatal Go-neuronal activity. b) Substantia nigra pars reticulata activity. c) Subthalamic nucleus
activity. d) Activity of the executive control complex consisting of DLPFC, SEF and pre-SMA.
trials that is less pronounced in inhibition trials (qualitative pattern #3).
We moreover analyzed the activity pattern of our executive control complex which consists of
DLPFC, SEF and pre-SMA. As can be seen in figure 14, activation is observed in stop-signal trials
(both stop-respond and successful inhibitions) only after SSRT and could thus had no influence on the
stopping (qualitative pattern #3). This result implies that global stopping to salient stop signals is
most likely driven by the fast stop process along the rIFG-STN hyperdirect pathway. We ascertain that
executive control processes are delayed relative to this global stopping mechanism, and may participate
in selective response inhibition (and in the stop-change task, activation of the correct response) after
the global response pause has passed.
3 Discussion
The interaction between executive control and habitual behavior is a central feature of higher-level
brain function, and plays a role in various domains from cognitive psychology (under the rubric of
“system 1” vs. “system 2”; (Evans, 2005)) to machine learning (model-free vs. model based control
(Daw et al., 2005)). At the core of this interaction is a mechanism that allows executive control to
override the habitual system and guide action selection. A multitude of psychological cognitive tasks
have been used to probe the nature of this interaction. The stop-signal task requires outright stop-
ping of a response already in the planning stage. The antisaccade (Hallett, 1979), Simon (Simon,
1969), and saccade override (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007, 2008) tasks all involve inhibition of a prepo-
tent action together with initiation of an action incompatible with the prepotent one. Despite the
apparent behavioral simplicity of these tasks, various lines of research have revealed a highly complex
and tightly interconnected brain network underlying response inhibition consisting of frontal areas
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including DLPFC, SEF, pre-SMA, FEF, rIFG, and dACC and basal ganglia structures including the
striatum and STN.
We presented a dynamic neural network model of selective and global response inhibition which
provides a description of the distributed computations carried out by individual brain regions and
neurotransmitters. The complexity of this model is grounded by well established neuroanatomical and
physiological considerations, and accounts for a wealth of key data including electrophysiology, psychi-
atric and pharmacological modulations, behavioral, lesion and imaging studies. Moreover, this model
is constrained (i) by using a single parameterization across all simulations of intact function and (ii) by
the multitude of qualitative results from different levels of analysis it is required to reproduce. Although
we used one parameterization across the intact model simulations, we also generalized the functionality
via systematic manipulations across a range of parameters. In other work (Wiecki & Frank, in prep),
we have shown that the emerging fundamental computational properties of this complex system as a
whole are captured by analysis using a modified drift diffusion model, in which distinct mechanisms
within the neural model (e.g., STN projection strength, DLPFC speed) are monotonically related to
high level decision parameters (e.g., decision threshold, and drift rate of the executive process).
3.1 Selective Response Inhibition
In our SRIT simulations, the model assumes that prepotent, reflexive actions such as a saccade to an
appearing stimulus (e.g. a prosaccade) are selected via the cortico-cortical route and swiftly gated
by the BG. An abundance of data supports the general involvement of the BG in saccade generation
and inhibition (e.g. Hikosaka et al., 2000; Hikosaka, 1989; Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1986). Conversely, the
cognitive control system not only represents the task rules needed to respond appropriately (e.g. in
DLPFC), but also incorporates a downstream mechanism in dACC-STN to detect when these rules
indicate an alternative action than was originally initiated. Thus our model synthesizes the popular
account of dACC in terms of response conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001) with recent studies suggesting
that dACC rather reflects the value of the alternative action (Kolling et al., 2012). Moreover, via
the hyperdirect pathway to the STN, this mechanism serves to transiently increase the BG gating
threshold to prevent prepotent actions from being facilitated and allows more time for the controlled
PFC-striatal mechanisms to selectively suppress this response and to facilitate appropriate alternative
courses of action. It has also been shown that the SEF, FEF (Munoz and Everling, 2004), dACC
(Botvinick et al., 2004), pre-SMA (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007) and STN (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008)
are involved in detecting conflict between a planned response and the current rule, and for switching
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from an automatic to a volitional response (e.g., antisaccades).
To detect conflict between reflexive and controlled responses, the system needs to be able to com-
pute the correct identity of the controlled response itself. In the model, the DLPFC integrates task
instructions and current stimulus location and forms a conjunctive rule representation (Wallis and
Miller, 2003; Bunge and Wallis, 2008) that then provides evidence for the associated controlled re-
sponse via its projection to the FEF, and further biases the gating of this response (and the selective
suppression of the reflexive response) via striatum. We demonstrated that this is a necessary condition
for our model by showing that a model with faster integration speeds fails to account for key behavioral
patterns.
Thus it should be clear that compared to a congruent response, an incongruent response should
(i) be more prone to error because it depends on successful inhibition of prepotent actions which
may be close to threshold by the time conflict is detected and (ii) take longer due to (iia) additional
computation needed for the DLPFC to perform the requisite vector inversion (activation of correct
rule representation among multiple competitors based on an integration of input and instruction), and
(iib) the delay in commitment to a response resulting from the increase in decision threshold along the
hyperdirect pathway.
Early cognitive models of interference control assumed a dual-route mechanism for action selection,
including an automatic response route and a volitional one (Kornblum et al., 1990; Eimer, 1995;
DeLiang et al., 2005; Ridderinkhof, 2002). This model was extended to include selective suppression
of the automatic response by the volitional response mechanism (i.e. the activation-suppression model
(Ridderinkhof, 2002; Ridderinkhof et al., 2011)). Our model shares these attributes but makes two
crucial contributions to this discussion: (i) strong predictions on the neural correlates of these abstract
cognitive processes, and (ii) a raise in decision threshold requiring more evidence to gate any response.
This latter mechanism may not only be adaptive as a fast route to prevent gating of prepotent actions,
but could also serve to increase the likelihood that the alternative action selected is the most accurate
(particularly when there may be more than one, as is often the case in more realistic executive control
scenarios than those typically studied in simple response inhibition tasks).
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3.1.1 Response time distributions and errors: Neural underpinnings
At the behavioral level, our intact model reproduces the same patterns found empirically – networks
made more errors (see figure 3(a)) and were in general slower (see figure 3(b)) on incongruent trials
compared to congruent trials (e.g. Reilly et al., 2006; Harris et al., 2006; Reilly et al., 2007; McDowell
et al., 2002). Incongruent errors were more likely to occur when networks responded fast (see figure
4, 5(a) and Ridderinkhof et al. (2011)). These errors result primarily from variance in the speed of
cognitive control (DLPFC), but also in the prepotent response (in some trials gating is faster than
others) and in the inhibition process (in some trials the hyperdirect pathway and/or striatal NoGo
process is slower). Moreover, reduced DLPFC connectivity also degrades accuracy on incongruent
trials, mirroring the empirical performance degradation in antisaccade tasks during development asso-
ciated with reduced DLPFC connectivity (Hwang et al., 2010). A more explicit investigation into the
dynamics of these processes comes from the simulated electrophysiology across brain regions and trial
types.
3.1.2 Conflict- and error-related activity: relation to existing models
The Error Related Negativity (ERN) is an event-related potential associated with errors made in
forced-choice reaction time tasks (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993). The ERN reaches its
peak within 100 ms after the erroneous response. Using a connectionist model, Yeung and collegues
hypothesize the ERN to reflect conflict between the executed, erroneous response and the still-evolving
activation of the correct response (Yeung and Cohen, 2006; Yeung et al., 2004b). Thus, the error detec-
tion mechanism reflects an internal correction of the executed response, leading to a transient period
of response conflict. According to this same framework, a similar potential should be observed in high
conflict trials before correct responses, when conflict is resolved prior to responding. These authors
indeed reported that the N2 potential exhibited just this profile and argued that it reflected the same
underlying conflict mechanism in the dACC.
Our dACC node exhibits the same qualitative pattern of increased activity (i) before correct incon-
gruent responses, (ii) after incorrect incongruent responses and (iii) baseline activity during congruent
responses. However, this pattern is not unique to ERPs thought to originate from dACC, but is also
found in electrophysiological recordings in pre-SMA, SEF (Emeric et al., 2010) and STN (Isoda and
Hikosaka, 2008). Our model provides an explicit framework that recapitulates these effects and ex-
plores their influences on behavior. Together, these dynamics accord with our earlier assertion that
our model synthesizes the conflict model with the notion that the dACC reflects the value of the alter-
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native action: this network only becomes activated when the alternative action is deemed to be more
correct than the prepotent one. This process occurs either prior or following response execution (as
in the conflict monitoring account), but must always occur after the initial activation of an incorrect
(often prepotent) response (not specified by the conflict account but consistent with the alternative
action value account). To more formally describe the computational dynamic implicated, we devised
a modified drift diffusion model which explicitly incorporates this reversal in evidence.
3.2 Global Response Inhibition
By adding a single rIFG layer to our model we generalized our model to capture data from global re-
sponse inhibition tasks such as the SST. As we demonstrated above, this model recovers key qualitative
behavioral patterns reported in the literature. Moreover, model neurophysiology revealed interesting
similarities to recent rat electrophysiological recordings in the SST (Schmidt et al., 2012). Specifically,
while STN activity surges in response to the stop signal to the same extent regardless of whether the
response is successfully inhibited or not, activity in the SNr strongly differentiates between these trial
types. During errors, the striatal Go signals were potent and early enough to inhibit SNr activity in
spite of the STN surge. These results suggest that the source of response inhibition errors is variance
in the Go process, but that the duration of the stop-process is rather fixed. This conceptualization
matches closely with the interactive horse-race model (Verbruggen and Logan, 2009a). Here, we hy-
pothesize that the critical point of interaction between the two processes is the SNr.
Why did we add an rIFG layer given that our initial model already contained an executive control
complex including DLPFC? As described above, rIFG and STN involvement in the SST is well estab-
lished, and moreover, simulations showed that the activations in our executive control complex needed
to account for SRITs was too slow to account for global response inhibition needed in SST. Never-
theless, the nature of the (potentially separable) mechanisms engaged for detecting when inhibitory
control is necessary, and how it should be implemented, remains largely elusive. In particular, the role
of rIFG is actively debated. Some studies specifically implicate the rIFG in response inhibition (Ver-
bruggen et al., 2010; Aron et al., 2003; Chambers et al., 2007; Sakagami et al., 2001; Xue et al., 2008),
whereas others report rIFG activity in tasks lacking pure response inhibition demands, suggesting that
it is more involved in monitoring or salience detection (Sharp et al., 2010; Verbruggen et al., 2010;
Hampshire et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2010; Chatham et al., 2012; Munakata et al., 2011). Our model
unifies these two seemingly opposing views by arguing that the rIFG in fact detects salient events and,
via downstream processing, engages a stopping mechanism whether or not it is required by the task
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rules. In both the stop-signal and stop-change task, subjects have to detect an infrequent signal which
tells them to update their current action plan. We argue that these signals are salient events and,
via noradrenergic modulation, enhance processing in the rIFG which, in turn, causes an orienting or
circuit breaker response by activating the STN (Swann et al., 2011a) to pause response selection. This
pause enables the volitional DLPFC based response selection mechanism to take control and either
inhibit a specific response (as in the stop-signal task) or initiate a new response (as in the stop-change
task). This theory of a rIFG triggering a global response-pause is supported by rIFG involvement in
the oddball task (Stevens, 2000; Huettel and McCarthy, 2004) which requires no behavior adaptation
whatsoever, yet still causes response slowing (Barcelo et al., 2006; Parmentier et al., 2008). Indeed,
in many of the above-reported studies in which rIFG is activated under conditions of monitoring or
saliency, when they have been reported, subject RTs were nevertheless delayed despite no overt in-
hibitory demands (Sharp et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2010; Chatham et al., 2012).
3.3 Different forms of response inhibition
Inhibitory control can be issued globally or selectively (Aron and Verbruggen, 2008; Aron, 2011). The
brain seems to revert to a global inhibitory mechanism when unexpected events occur that require
quick response adaptation (e.g., stop-signals), and to a selective inhibitory control mechanism when
response inhibition can be prepared (Greenhouse et al., 2011; Hu and Li, 2011). We propose that
selective inhibition of the prepotent response is initiated by the DLPFC and implemented via the
indirect corticostriatal NoGo pathway (Zandbelt and Vink, 2010; Watanabe and Munoz, 2009, 2010;
Hu and Li, 2011; Jahfari et al., 2011). Global response inhibition on the other hand is driven by a
salience detection mechanism implemented in the rIFG which directly projects to the STN to inhibit
responding (Mink, 1996; Nambu et al., 2000, 2002; Kuhn et al., 2004; Aron et al., 2007b; Eagle et al.,
2008; Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008; Jahfari et al., 2011, 2012).
In addition to the selectivity of inhibitory control, differences exist between proactive and reactive
initiation of response inhibition (Aron, 2011; Greenhouse et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2011b; Cai et al.,
2011). Our modeling work suggests multiple possible sources for proactive control. Speed-accuracy
adjustments are implemented by increasing functional connectivity between frontal motor regions
and striatum to decrease the decision threshold under speed emphasis (see figure 5(b), 5(c) and Lo
and Wang (2006); Forstmann et al. (2010)). The second proactive mechanism increases response
caution by increasing baseline rIFG activity to prime saliency detection and slow responding via
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the rIFG-STN hyperdirect pathway (see figure 13(b)). Interestingly, while FEF→striatum functional
connectivity influence speed and accuracy in our SRIT simulations, SSRT in the stop-signal task is
unaffected by this modulations and is only improved by an increase in tonic rIFG activity. This
suggests that proactive control in form of mere response slowing is uneffective in reducing SSRT – the
staircase procedure adapts to slower overall responding – but that enhanced attentional monitoring
has preferential influence on global inhibitory control. In other words, although all these mechanisms
can lead to adjustments in decision threshold, only those associated with active engagement of the
stop process will facilitate inhibitory control per se. If confirmed, this result may have implications
for refining therapy of inhibitory control disorders like addiction, obesity and OCD. Nevertheless, it
remains important to emphasize that the striatal NoGo pathway is also thought to help to prevent the
proactive selection of maladaptive responses.
3.4 Multiple mechanisms of response threshold regulation in fronto-basal-
ganglia circuitry at different time scales
Different mechanisms in our neural network influence the gating threshold for initiating motor re-
sponses at distinct time scales, and modulated by distinct cognitive variables. First, the strength of
cortico-striatal projections regulate the ease with which cortical motor plans can be gated by the BG,
allowing for speed emphasis in the speed-accuracy tradeoff (see figure 5(c)). This aspect of our model
is quite similar to the model of Lo and Wang (2006) and was subsequently corroborated by Forstmann
et al. (2010). Our model converges on the same conclusion but extends this view by showing that
gating threshold is also more dynamically regulated on a shorter time-scale by (i) motivational state
(changes in DA levels, which are modulated by reinforcement and also facilitate striatal Go signals);
and (ii) response conflict and saliency (via the hyperdirect pathway, making it more difficult or Go
signals to drive BG gating (Jahfari et al., 2011)). Moreover, STN efficacy in the neural model is pos-
itively correlated with increases in estimated decision threshold (Ratcliff and Frank, 2012). Evidence
for conflict-induced decision threshold adjustment via the hyperdirect pathway has been recently de-
scribed in a reinforcement-based decision making task (Cavanagh et al., 2011). Increases in frontal
EEG activity during high conflict decisions were related to increases in decision threshold estimated
by the drift diffusion model. Intracranial recordings directly within the STN also revealed decision
conflict-related activity during the same time period and frequency range as observed over frontal
electrodes (see also Zaghloul et al. (2012)). Moreover, disruption of STN function with deep brain
stimulation led to a reversal of the relationship between frontal EEG and decision threshold, without
altering frontal activity itself. These data thus support the notion that frontal-STN communication
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is involved in decision threshold adjustment as a function of conflict. Similarly, proactive preparation
to increase decision threshold in the stop signal task when stop signals are likely is associated with
hyperdirect pathway activity (Jahfari et al., 2012).
In our neural models, conflict-related STN activity subsides with time (see figure 8), due to resolu-
tion of conflict in FEF/ACC, feedback inhibition from GPe, and neural accommodation. Thus a more
refined description of this transient STN surge is that it initially increases the decision threshold (more
so with conflict), followed by a dynamic collapse of the decision threshold over time. Indeed, a recent
multilevel computational modeling and behavioral study by Ratcliff and Frank (2012) supported this
idea by showing that a collapsing threshold diffusion model provided good fits to both the BG model
and to human participant choices in a reinforcement conflict task. Moreover, the temporal profile
of the best-fitting collapsing threshold corresponded well to the time course of the collapse in STN
activity across time.
3.5 Psychiatric disorders and differential effects of dopamine and nore-
pinephrine
Abnormal striatal DA signaling is hypothesized to be at the core of many disorders, including PD
(Bernheimer et al., 1973), SZ (Breier et al., 1998) and ADHD (Casey et al., 2007; Frank et al., 2007b).
Intriguingly, all of these disorders are linked to response inhibition deficits in the stop-signal task. Our
earlier BG models have successfully accounted for a wide variety of findings associated with striatal DA
manipulations across reinforcement learning and working memory tasks (for review, Wiecki and Frank,
2010). Yet, we found here that striatal DA manipulations, while affecting overall RT, had negligible
effects on response inhibition deficits as assessed by SSRT (see figure 13(b)). This prediction converges
with recent evidence (reviewed in, Munakata et al., 2011) showing that levodopa, a drug that increases
DA levels in striatum (Harden and Grace, 1995), had no influence on SSRT in PD patients (Obeso
et al., 2011a,b).
This lack of DA effect raises the question of the source of the response inhibition deficits in the
aforementioned disorders. One conspicuous candidate is abnormal NE functioning as suggested by
evidence in both ADHD (Faraone et al., 2005; Ramos and Arnsten, 2007; Frank et al., 2007c) and
PD (Farley et al., 1978). In our simulations, NE modulation influences SSRT via its gain-modulatory
effects in rIFG (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Additional support for this account comes from
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pharmacological experiments using the selective norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor atomoxetine, which
improves response inhibition performance in animals, healthy adults and ADHD patients (Chamberlain
et al., 2007, 2009). Moreover, fMRI analysis revealed that atomoxetine exerted its beneficial effects via
modulation of rIFG (Chamberlain et al., 2009), providing additional support for the model mechanisms.
Finally, this highlights an alternative source for response inhibition deficits observed in PD patients
previously linked to DA dysfunction (see Vazey and Aston-Jones (2012) for a review highlighting the
importance of aberrant NE signaling in cognitive deficits of PD patients).
4 Limitations
Despite our model’s success in reproducing and explaining a wide array of data and offering potential
solutions for long standing issues in the field, we certainly acknowledge that there are many errors
of omission and – although we did not include any biological features that are unsupported by data
– perhaps some errors of commission. We note however note that most of our assumptions and
simulations are largely orthogonal to each other. Thus, each aspect of the model is falsifiable on its
own, without necessarily falsifying other aspects. We discuss a few salient limitations below; it is by
no means exhaustive.
4.1 Specificity of PFC regions and function
While the BG of our neural network model is fairly concrete and solidly grounded on ample anatomical
electrophysiological, and functional evidence, the individual contributions of frontal regions including
DLPFC, SEF, pre-SMA, FEF and dACC are not as well established currently. For example, we
identified an executive control network in our model consisting of DLPFC, SEF and pre-SMA. The
task rules and necessary motor commands to follow them are implemented by hard-coded input and
output weight patterns of its extended network (i.e. sensory input, instruction, FEF and striatum).
This implementation short-circuits a lot of the computational complexities the biological system has
to solve; (i) the executive controller has to selectively retrieve the appropriate rule for the current
trial from short or long-term working memory; (ii) integrate the sensory evidence to compute the
correct response (e.g. via vector inversion); (iii) compute the necessary motor sequences to perform
the correct action; and (iv) identify incorrectly activated prepotent responses and selectively suppress
them. While neural network models with a more detailed representation of PFC exist (e.g. O’Reilly
and Frank, 2006) in which rule-like representations can develop through experience, how exactly the
necessary computations can be implemented dynamically is as-of-today a still unresolved question.
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Critically, our focus in this work was on how PFC and BG interact when inhibitory control is
required by extending the detailed BG model by Frank (2006). We also account for some electrophysi-
ologcal data in frontal cortex, while acknowledging that there is still some uncertainty in the respective
roles of these areas and their interactions which will be open for revision as more data become available.
4.2 Learning
Previous BG models explored the role of DA in feedback driven learning (Wiecki and Frank, 2010). As
humans (but not monkeys) are able to perform this task without learning, we chose to remain agnostic
about the type of learning that takes place prior to performing the task. We thus hard-coded task
rules into the model. An additional driving factor is the lack of published reports on specific learning
phenomena in the SST and AST.
5 Conclusions
We presented a comprehensive, biologically plausible model of global and selective response inhibition
which takes known properties of the neuronal underpinnings into account and tries to link them with
results from cognitive science, electrophysiology, imaging studies and pharmacological experiments.
Here, we showed that augmenting our previously described BG model with the addition of the FEF,
DLPFC, and rIFG allows us to simulate control over prepotent responses and to capture a wealth of
data in this domain across multiple levels of analysis. We furthermore provide multiple mechanisms
that can lead to disruptions in inhibitory control processes and which have implications for interpre-
tation of data from patients with psychiatric disorders such as SZ and ADHD. Our model shows that
the observed deficits in inhibitory control paradigms do not necessarily have to reflect dysfunctional
response inhibition per se but could be due to other factors such as salience, conflict detection and/or
motivation, and related to distinct neural mechanisms.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Software
The model and the Python scripts are available at http://ski.clps.brown.edu/BG Projects/.
7.2 Implementation details
Like the original Frank (2006) model, this model is implemented in the Emergent neural modeling
software framework (Aisa et al., 2008), which can be downloaded here:
http://grey.colorado.edu/emergent/index.php/Main Page.
Emergent measures simulator time in cycles. Here, we convert this time to ms by multiplying cycles
by 4 to roughly match behavioral and electrophysiological data.
Emergent uses point neurons with excitatory, inhibitory, and leak conductances contributing to
an integrated membrane potential, which is then thresholded and transformed via an xx+1 sigmoidal
function to produce a rate code output communicated to other neurons (discrete spiking can also be
used, but produces noisier results).
The membrane potential Vm is a function of ionic conductances g with reversal (driving) potentials
E as follows:
4Vm(t) = τ
∑
c
gc(t)gc(Ec − Vm(t)) (1)
with 3 channels (c) corresponding to: e excitatory input; l leak current; and i inhibitory input.
Following electrophysiological convention, the overall conductance is decomposed into a time-varying
component gc(t) computed as a function of the dynamic state of the model, and a constant gc that
controls the relative influence of the different conductances. The equilibrium potential can be written
41
in a simplified form by setting the excitatory driving potential (Ee) to 1 and the leak and inhibitory
driving potentials (El and Ei) of 0:
V∞m =
gege
gege + glgl + gigi
(2)
which shows that the neuron is computing a balance between excitation and the opposing forces of
leak and inhibition. This equilibrium form of the equation can be understood in terms of a Bayesian
decision making framework (O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000).
The excitatory net input/conductance ge(t) or ηj is computed as the proportion of open excitatory
channels as a function of sending activations times the weight values:
ηj = ge(t) = 〈xiwij〉 = 1
n
∑
i
xiwij (3)
The inhibitory conductance can either be computed by the kWTA function described in the next
section or by modeling inhibitory interneurons. Leak is a constant.
Activation communicated to other cells (yj) is a thresholded (Θ) sigmoidal function of the membrane
potential with gain parameter γ:
yj(t) =
1(
1 + 1γ[Vm(t)−Θ]+
) (4)
where [x]+ is a threshold function that returns 0 if x0 and x if x0. To avoid dividing by 0 we assume
yj(t) = 0 if it returns 0. This activation is subject to scaling factors (wt scale.abs and wt scale.rel)
which modify how much impact the projections have on the post-synaptic neurons.
7.3 Inhibition within and between layers
Inhibition between layers (i.e. for GABAergic projections between BG layers and striatal inhibitory
interneurons) is achieved via simple unit inhibition, where the inhibitory current gi for the unit is deter-
mined from the net input of the sending unit. For within layer lateral inhibition (used here in premotor
cortex), Leabra uses a kWTA (k-Winners-Take-All) function to achieve inhibitory competition among
neurons within each layer (area). The kWTA function computes a uniform level of inhibitory current
for all neurons in the layer, such that the k + 1th most excited unit within a layer is generally below
its firing threshold, while the kth is typically above threshold. Activation dynamics similar to those
produced by the kWTA function have been shown to result from simulated inhibitory interneurons
that project both feedforward and feedback inhibition (O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). Thus, although
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the kWTA function is somewhat biologically implausible in its implementation (e.g., requiring global
information about activation states and using sorting mechanisms), it provides a computationally ef-
fective approximation to biologically plausible inhibitory dynamics. kWTA is computed via a uniform
level of inhibitory current for all neurons in the layer as follows:
gi = g
Θ
k+1 + q(g
Θ
k − gΘk+1) (5)
where 0q1 (0.25 default) is a parameter Θ for setting the inhibition between the upper bound of
gk and Θ . These boundary inhibition values are the lower bound of gk+1 computed as a function of
the level of inhibition necessary to keep a unit right at threshold:
gi = g
Θ
k+1 + q(g
Θ
k − gΘk+1) (6)
In the basic version of the kWTA function, which is relatively rigid about the kWTA constraint
and is therefore used for output layers, gΘk and g
Θ
k+1 are set to the threshold inhibition value for the
kth and k+1th most excited neurons, respectively. Thus, the inhibition is placed exactly to allow k
neurons to be above threshold, and the remainder below threshold. For this version, the q parameter
is almost always .25, allowing the kth unit to be sufficiently above the inhibitory threshold.
The premotor cortex uses the average-based kWTA version, gΘk is the average g
Θ
i value for the
top k most excited neurons, and gΘk+1 is the average of g
Θ
i for the remaining n − k neurons. This
version allows for more flexibility in the actual number of neurons active depending on the nature of
the activation distribution in the layer and the value of the q parameter (which is typically .6), and is
therefore used for hidden layers.
Hysterisis and Accommodation
Ia(t) = ga(t)g¯a(Vm(t)− Ea) (7)
Ih(t) = gh(t)g¯h(Vm(t)− Eh) (8)
Eh is excitatory; Ea inhibitory.
ga and gh are time-varying functions that depend on previous activity, integrated over different
time periods.
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ga(t) =
 ga(t− 1) + dtga(1− ga(t− 1)); if(ba(t) = Θa)ga(t− 1) + dtga(0− ga(t− 1)); if(ba(t) = Θd) (9)
7.4 Computation of conflict
dACC activity is the Hopfield energy of pre-SMA:
dACCact = FEFleftact ∗ FEFrightact (10)
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